

Zambia Against Apartheid A Case on Apartheid- Caused Debt

**A Study
by
Gabriel C Banda
For
ACTSA-JCTR**

August-October, 2000, Lusaka

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A Moral Task for All

Zambia's role in the struggle against racism and Apartheid was a moral one which was part of a universal struggle by humanity. Zambia sought peace, justice, and the harmony of humanity. The peace sought is a peace which is wider than the absence of war. It was the peace of "Salaam," "Shalom," and in Southern Africa's languages, it is the peace of "Mutende," "Uhuru." It is a peace that deals with harmony and well-being of life and humankind through and amongst all components: individuals, communities, peoples, nations, and species.

Apartheid, legalised in 1948 at the coming to power of the National Party in South Africa, was a Crime against Humanity. It worked against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, made by the United Nations in 1948. Like the racism inspired slavery and World Wars had cost much, by the time official Apartheid had been dismantled and Nelson Mandela became South Africa's president in 1994, the struggle against Apartheid had cost Zambia, neighbours and humanity much.

People all over the world, working as governments and civil society, acted for the integrity of life and against racial separation. Zambia was the "spearhead",¹ later joined in the "Frontline States"² by neighbours and people all over the world. against apartheid.

Because action for and against apartheid-racism was world-wide, so too did the effects affect many all over the world. For Zambia and neighbouring countries, there were costs to the fight against apartheid and racism in Southern Africa. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported, in Volume Two, that from 1960 to 1994, the majority of the Apartheid regime's gross human rights violations "occurred not internally but beyond the borders of South Africa..."³

"The majority of the victims of the South African government's attempts to maintain itself in power were outside of South Africa. Tens of thousands of people in the region died as a direct or indirect result of the South African government's aggressive intent towards its neighbours."⁴

The TRC also notes apartheid South Africa's effect on livelihood and infrastructure: "The lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of others were disrupted by the systematic targeting of

Zambia, in collaboration with others, influenced many UN resolutions on Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia. Frantic action was made to prevent the Southern Rhodesia November 1965 "Unilateral Declaration of Independence," UDI, and the armed conflict which would arise. For the first time in UN history, through Security Council Resolution 253, "mandatory sanctions," which were obligatory for all UN members, were passed against Rhodesia in December 1966. Britain, the proposer, said the sanctions would end the Rhodesian rebellion "within a matter of weeks rather than months." This was not to be, thus creating a big cost on Zambia.

At the United Nations, various sanctions were made against Rhodesia and South Africa - South Africa for its Apartheid in South Africa and its illegal occupation of Namibia. Apartheid was declared a "Crime Against Humanity." In November 1973 was passed the International Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid, as Resolution 3068 (XXVII). In 1989, the UN Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (A/RES/S-16/1), recognised the impact of apartheid on Zambia and Southern Africa. The Southern African countries were to be supported in their struggle.

Action World Wide

To remove UDI and racism, sanctions covered: trade, investment, oil, military, sports, and cultural collaboration. Sanctions ranged from "selective" to the wider "comprehensive", and Comprehensive *Mandatory* Sanctions, which can be enforced by international law. World wide, action gathered momentum and came through governments and civil society. Civil society actors, inside and outside South Africa, included churches - through continental and global religious movements - trade unions, town councils, artists, sports men and sports women, and individual protesters all over the world. Action by humanity was world-wide. By the 1980s, disinvestment from South Africa became big action at various levels. In USA, there was then the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Zambia's government believed that the cost of comprehensive sanctions was negligible when compared to the violent disruption that would arise from the racial conflict.¹⁰

However, in collaboration with South Africa working in South Africa and Namibia, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, multi-national and transnational businesses, and some governments in the Western hemisphere, Rhodesia and the racist regimes of Southern Africa were sustained for a long period through breaking sanctions - from arms¹¹ to oil. The sanction violators were centres of government and commercial interests and banks¹² in Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Asia. Even the World Bank and IMF, despite United Nations recommendations, lent money to apartheid South Africa. In the report *South Africa. The Sanctions Report*¹³, the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1990 showed that although sanctions had been at an expense for South Africa, the measures were broken.

Portuguese official Jorge Jardim called Zambia "the main victim" in the Rhodesia oil sanctions saga where sanctions were broken by individuals, communities, and institutions in the minority-ruled Southern Africa and beyond.¹⁴ The circumvention, ineffectiveness, and failure of the various sanctions contributed to the huge losses in human life and Zambia's economy that

- political.
- debt situation

As these aspects were inherent in the conflict, so too have their multiple effects come upon Zambia. Each aspect affected all other aspects in a complex and holistic interaction. Finally, the immediate and long-term bearings combine to affect opportunities and future development of Zambia's people.

3.1 ECONOMIC AND FINANCE

The potential economic impact of landlocked Zambia's participation in the struggle was already inherent right at Zambia's independence. Trade, routes, and resources were closely linked with racist Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique.¹⁸ Utilities such as railways, airways, airforce, the Kariba Dam and hydro-electric power station had been jointly owned by the Federation. At the 1963 Victoria Falls conference dissolution of the Federation's assets, Zambia did not get a fair share. Zambia's government also inherited a debt of K50 million, then worth 25 million to 30 million pounds from the British government.¹⁹

Although getting a lot from copper earnings, potential effects on Zambia were thus great. Action such as sanctions, by Zambia and the international community, with the Rhodesians and South Africans in turn imposing counter-sanctions and levies, affected Zambia's access to imports and exports, routes to the sea, access to energy sources like electricity and coal, and defence and security.

Zambia sought de-linkage and disengagement, and established new economic partnerships, development of infrastructure, and utilities.

Objectives on trade and economy involved:

- **Sanctions.** Rising from K35 million, then \$49 million, in 1967, with Britain once giving Zambia K13.85 million to cover impact of sanctions,²⁰ which in 1976-77 alone cost Zambia some \$932.3 million,²¹ we have found that from 1965 to 1990, the cost to Zambia of implementing sanctions, and the effects of counter-sanctions, has been in excess of \$9.630 billion at 1998 values.
- **Establishing alternative trade and economic links:** Italy, Yugoslavia, China, and Israel, for some time, began to feature in major projects. Supplies from Britain, India, and Japan were increased.
- **Diversification of Aid.** Alternative aid links made included Ireland, Canada, the Scandinavian and Nordic countries.
- **Re-routing imports and exports.** At UDI to some time in 1966, with the assistance of

the racist regimes raided Zambia many times. Major General Tom Fara, one time in charge of the Zambia Army Zambezi River front, says that the Portuguese had a "write-off" approach and would destroy people and villages suspected of aiding freedom fighters. ²⁹

The *SIPRI Year Book 1978* records Zambia buying 100 Rapier Surface to Air Missile systems from Britain as "protection against Rhodesia incursions." ³⁰ Various countries, Western and "Eastern," were, to various degrees, partners in Zambia's defence supply and struggle: ³¹ Lt Gen Benjamin Mibenge, former Zambia Army and Zambia National Defence Force commander, notes: "Our economic development was stunted because resources which we should otherwise have spent on development had to go into defending ourselves." ³²

By the 1980s, defence expenditure, much of it against apartheid, was around 25% of Zambia's export earning. ³³ We find that *from 1964 to beginning 1990, Zambia spent at least some \$3.870 billion*, at current costs, on defence. At 1998 values, *the amount spent on defence is a minimum \$8.150 billion*. Of this, some \$5.433 billion can be said to be extra defence spending due to apartheid. At least half of these are linked to loans.

3.4 HUMAN AND HUMANITARIAN COSTS:

Death and Injury. General Kingsley Chinkuli, first Zambia Army and Zambia National Defence Force commander, notes: "The cost was also enormous in terms of life which was lost by those who were bombed, those who were maimed by land mines along the border." ³⁴

The Rhodesians, South Africans, and Portuguese made incursions into Zambia from 1965 to 1989 - leading to deaths and injury. ³⁵ Just in one raid, in August 1978, 12 people in Sesheke were killed. ³⁶ The Chikumbi raid killed hundreds.

From various records and testimonies of military attacks, we estimate that for the period 1964 - 1990, many thousands, both Zambians and non-Zambians, civilians and combatants, died from military action in Zambia. To count *war-related deaths*, ³⁷ including deaths indirectly brought about by the Southern Africa war, the 1980 - 1988 United Nations figure of 51,100, rises greatly. Right now, more people are still dying as a result of apartheid-related economic and debt after-effects.

Displacement and Refuge. The Southern Africa race conflict also led to displacement and creation of refugees in the region and beyond. Locally, Zambia's people, especially those on border areas, were displaced due to the armed conflict. Personal and communal *displacement* makes displaced persons still lag behind in basic needs and, in a situation of general economic stress, bear more hardship than more settled persons.

Zambia worked together with UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) and United Nations, NGOs like Lutheran World Federation, bilateral and multilateral organisations, to support refugees *morally and materially* - with basic needs, and protection. ³⁸ Although costs are still being counted, for this cost, the period 1964 - 1994 required a *minimum \$500 million*.

.Apartheid cost, the advances made since independence would have been sustained longer.

Says Dr Kaunda: "And having decided to go full scale in support of the liberation movements, we had to take that risk. Indeed, as we all know, the Zambian people and the country of Zambia paid that high price."⁴¹

Cooperating partners supported Zambia in military, social, economic, and other support. Some support, like the State House tunnels built by Yugoslavs for military protection, came as grants. But other support came as loans which up to year 2000 have a bearing on Zambia's debt stock and quality of life.

Among key early supporters were Italy, Yugoslavia, China, India, USSR, and the OAU in multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Japan was key in trade. There were also the wide body of governments, such as Scandinavian-Nordic countries, solidarity groups, and civil society members all over the world. But the impact on Zambia remained long and deep.

The struggle was beneficial for humanity. Said Nelson Mandela in 1990, "when on freedom day we count the heroes of our struggle, the city of Lusaka would rank amongst our most gallant heroes."⁴²

4.2 THE DEBATE: COST AND BENEFITS.

There were costs and benefits in Zambia's support for the liberation struggle. Economic and human development was affected. It led to the indebtedness and harsh debt conditions of the 1980s through 1990s and the new millennium. Although infrastructure and capacity were built, much debt arose in the process of acquiring infrastructure. Some infrastructure was created when under pressure, leading to opportunity costs which would not have been there had there not been the Southern Africa pressure. The infrastructure would have been developed more gradually and in a manner sustainable to the economy.

DEBT AND APARTHEID

While copper and oil prices were stable, Zambia could afford its roles in basic needs and the Southern Africa liberation struggle. In the 1970s, as copper prices lowered, and oil prices increased world wide following the Middle-East war of 1973 and the increase of 1979, Zambia's economy could not easily sustain a) the freedom struggle, and, b), basic needs. To continue supporting both, Zambia borrowed money.

By 1975, Zambia's external debt was \$1.465 billion, with a high debt service ratio of 23-25%.⁴³ By 1990, at the release of Nelson Mandela, Zambia's debt had reached \$ 7 billion. *The economic cost of Zambia's role in the liberation struggle is higher than the external debt at years 1990 and 2000.* Zambia had covered much of the impact through its own resources. Even with low copper income and high fuel prices, without the fight against apartheid, Zambia would not have

IMF	1,219.164
Others	143.848

PARASTATAL AND PRIVATE DEBT	<u>455.883</u>
	<u>\$6,419.244</u>

Most of the debt, some \$5.963 billion, is owed to governments and multilateral lenders. *Zambia had borrowed the money for two main reasons: a) to cover costs of the Southern Africa liberation struggle, and b) to continue to meet the cost of basic needs - schools, education, food, infrastructure, and other essentials.*

Michael Sata, Minister without Portfolio and ruling MMD National Secretary in 2000 recalls: "... the money which came from copper went to build schools. When UNIP came into power, there was a reason why there was free education." ⁴⁵

No Misuse of Resources

Loans were *not* diverted from their goals. Emmanuel Kasonde, first Finance Minister in the MMD government of 1991, who was also Finance Ministry Permanent Secretary after independence, says much borrowing was for necessary basic needs ⁴⁶ and well used: "It was necessary to borrow very heavily... As far as I know, at least I was Permanent Secretary in the treasury, the funds went to the purposes for which they were intended. There was no misuse of public resources at that time." ⁴⁷

And Patrick Malambo, Ministry of Finance Director of External Resource Mobilisation notes: "We had various projects to carry out. We realised that for us to carry out these projects, we would need external assistance, to borrow from someone else." ⁴⁸

Some segments of Zambia's debt are *apartheid-caused borrowing* and follow sectors of the costs of apartheid: trade and economic sanctions, infrastructural and utilities development, and defence spending. The general economic cost of apartheid is higher than Zambia's year 2000 external debt..:

Loans

The first stand-by facility from IMF, made in 1973, at 19 million SDR. (then K14.75 million, or \$22.92 million), was linked to the economic effects of the January 1973 Rhodesia border closure against Zambia. This first IMF borrowing in 1973 was worth around \$73 million. Zambia borrowed in order to stabilise the economy. Sanctions and trade costs made Zambia divert resources from more of basic needs and, to replace those resources, borrow.

From another IMF loan of SDR 229.8 million in the late 1970s, we will assume half was to cover or remedy, directly or indirectly, apartheid causes. The half was about \$149 million. In 1998, this was around \$304 million. From these two loans only, we have \$377 million. Many

Relevant loans of this infrastructure mentioned here cost some: \$604.2 million at the various times of investment. At 1998 values, this money is around \$2.266 billion.

Defence and Loans

Taking a third of the defence cost, we may find that some \$5,433.6 can be said to be extra defence spending due to apartheid. At least half of these are linked to loans - giving a minimum \$2.700 billion as defence related loans.

TOTAL DEBT LINKED TO APARTHEID

In March 2000, Zambia's external debt was \$6.419 billion. Meanwhile without counting political organisation and humanitarian costs, we have found that from 1964 to 1990, at least \$5.345 billion, at 1998 values, can be linked to Zambia's situation against apartheid and racism:

Table 4:

<i>Sector</i>	<i>\$, Millions, 1998</i>
Infrastructure and Utilities	2,266.2
Sanctions and Trade	377.0
Military and Defence	<u>2,700.0</u>
	\$5,345.2

Loans linked to *Political organisation* and *Humanitarian action* still need to be costed. In fact, it may well be that the total loans borrowed by Zambia in relation to apartheid are now valued beyond the present external debt figure of \$6.419 billion as at March 2000.⁵⁵

Our analysis here extends a previous estimate, of \$3.143 billion⁵⁶ (Joe Hanlon, 1988) which mainly covered 1975-1994. Our estimates have mainly been for cost and debt incurred 1964 - 1990. Our loans figures mostly cover 1964 to mid 1970s, when much of Zambia's borrowing for infrastructure and economic stabilisation happened. Merging our estimates of 1964-1990 to the \$3.143 billion of 1975-1994, we can in fact extend the total debt linked to apartheid to be over \$7 billion.

This apartheid-caused debt can cancel out Zambia's outstanding balances, with arrears, penalties, and interest, of \$6.419 billion. Without the contribution of apartheid events to the costs, today's debt is unlikely to have been there or to that level. The strain of Zambia's people would not have been heavy.

Indivisible Debt, Wholesome Debt

Some of the debt, especially related to trade, was acquired after 1990. Some of it relates to past military and economic defence against apartheid.

Most multilateral lenders, including World Bank and IMF, have Zambia's debt whose borrowing was linked to the apartheid situation. As apartheid affected all sectors, most present loans outstanding are linked to the situation of Zambia during anti-apartheid effort and economic reconstruction and balancing post-apartheid. Apartheid had short-term and long-term effects on Zambia.

7.0 LEGACY AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS

The continued effect of the liberation struggle on Zambia and its people's access to basic needs is wide. Some effects include:

- *Displacement*. After the end of apartheid, while many refugees have returned to their homes outside Zambia, there still has been no organised national or international effort to deal with Zambia's persons displaced due to the Southern Africa race conflict. The deprivation of displaced persons has been aggravated by Zambia's declined national economic environment which has put many people on the margins.

. *lack of infrastructure* in some areas, like Sinazeze and Lake Kariba area: a) Infrastructure was destroyed during the freedom war, b) Some infrastructure was not established in areas because of intense armed strife there, c) due to redirecting of resources to the struggle and due to the various effects of the struggle, resources were inadequate to cover all areas. Even in year 2000, Zambian NGO Women for Change members⁵⁷ face problems caused by apartheid. "People are in poverty," says Women for Change Executive Director Emily Sikazwe, "due to impoverishment as a result of Zambia's support for the liberation struggle.... Women for Change has to pick up the pieces. It becomes a burden for an NGO like us. By ourselves, we don't have the capacity to deal with the problems at hand."⁵⁸

. *Deaths and physical injury* continuing due to land mines, and bombs. In Chikumbi, near Lusaka, Jessy Phiri, "Kankhondo's Mother", says residents are still being injured due to bombs.⁵⁹ The *Land Mine Monitor 1999*⁶⁰ records at least 200 people died or maimed by landmines in Zambia in the 20 years since 1980, Zimbabwe's independence.

. *Land mines barrier*. No-go areas due to land mines. National authorities, civil society, and the international community still need to get organised and embark on a very organised effective land-mine clearing programme.

. *External Debt*. Due to Southern Africa struggle-induced economic and military pressures on resources, Zambia balance of payment problems - leading to debt. On the eve of the 36th anniversary of Zambia's independence, President Frederick Chiluba said that Zambia's debt situation is constraining growth.⁶¹ We note that debt has led to the economic liberalisation policies which have affected the quality of life and:

Table 6:

Zambia Life Expectancy⁶⁷

<u>Period</u>	<u>Years</u>		
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Average</i>
1969	44.6	47.8	46.2
1990	52.0	55.0	53.5
1996	-	-	43.0
1998	39.9	41.0	40.5

The year 2000 UNDP *Human Development Report* shows that life expectancy in 1998 was some 40.5 years - 41 years for females and 39.9 years for males. The combination of impact on Zambia's people has led to a decline in the UNDP Human Development Index ranking - from 117 of 160 countries in 1992, to 136 out of 174 in 1996, and 153 out of 174 in the year 2000. (HDI ranking 1 has the best and 174 is the weakest).

Present policies and the past political situation in Southern Africa have combined to negatively affect quality of life of Zambia's people.

8.0 AREAS OF ACTION ON APARTHEID-CAUSED DEBT and ECONOMIC IMPACT

It is established that Zambia suffered due to following an agenda of humankind for the common good. Zambia was the "spear-head" in support with others all over the world. However, in proportion to the racism forces, there was inadequate support for Zambia a) during the struggle, and b) no post-struggle reconstruction of communities and the nation. This was affected by the 1991 change in Zambia's governments. Some issues remain for coordinated local, regional, and global action:

- ***Land Mines and bombs*** still affect Zambia's areas of conflict. There is need for organised official and international efforts for land mine and bomb disposal. There is need for improved technology. Former military personnel, civil society, and the government of Zambia can work on the issue of de-mining. However, in September 2000 a USA team followed on a UN team and visited Zambia on a land mine study mission. Zambia's Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Valentine Kayope mentioned that the land mines were mainly in the boundary areas facing previous racist regimes. Working with local efforts in many sectors, this USA team's visit may be a jump-start on resolving the apartheid legacy of land mines.

- ***Integrating Issue of Apartheid's Contribution*** to Zambia's economic difficulties and debt. Put on the agenda, this will help make approaches more in support of the development process.

4. Parastatal Debt: for support utilities such as NCZ, lMaamba coal mine. Much of parastatal debt was guaranteed or supported by government.

iii. Commercial Debt: This ratio is insignificant but can also be tied to argument on parastatal debt

Some banks world-wide also supported the apartheid regime.

- *Aid and Support for Post-apartheid Reconstruction*, official and people-to-people links for rehabilitation: de-mining, people's development programmes, rural and border areas; infrastructural development: Governments and peoples can include those from South Africa, Portugal, Canada, Scandinavian countries, former Warsaw Pact countries. Some sensitive cases can start with People-to-People and NGO collaboration. Official and bilateral support programmes may follow in some cases. The North-South civil society linkages that have helped in many campaigns need to be used so that there is a multiple, collaborated approach to this problem of humanity.

- *Regional action*, by SADC governments and civil society, on reconstruction and rehabilitation due to apartheid-racism impact and apartheid-caused debt. There is need for both governmental and civil society networking at regional and wider levels. In 1989, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimated that between 1980 and 1988, some 1.5 million died and some \$60 billion was lost in economic losses amongst independent Southern African countries.⁶⁸ The governments have got together before - in the Front-line States group, SADC, and COMESA. It is possible for them to work together again. Civil society groups working on the issue of debt and apartheid-caused debt need to strengthen bonds and networking.

Sensitizing local NGOs and Civil Society, especially those working in areas which had armed conflict, to the issue of reconstruction after apartheid-caused impact and debt.

Conclusion

Zambia played a key role in the struggle against racism and apartheid in Southern Africa. As racism is a crime against humanity, this was a global struggle for the whole of humanity. However,

- The *effects* of Zambia's role against apartheid live on.
- Without the cost of apartheid, even with poor copper prices and high oil prices, Zambia could have locally met much of its *social-basic needs* - largely from its own resources. Had it not been for the cost of apartheid, Zambia's post-independence basic needs programme advances could have increased. The quality of life is likely to have been much higher today than the achievements made.
- In the struggle against racism in Southern Africa, although it was a concern for all humanity.

economic, and social. Some areas lag behind in infrastructure and basic services because of armed conflict of the liberation wars.

"People are in poverty," says Women for Change Executive Director Emily Sikazwe, "due to impoverishment as a result of Zambia's support for the liberation struggle.... Women for Change has to pick up the pieces. It becomes a burden for an NGO like us. By ourselves, we don't have the capacity to deal with the problems at hand."⁶⁹

Even in the year 2000, long after apartheid South Africa's transition in 1994, it is difficult in some areas for community members to move to organise themselves or have access to basic services. Says Elizabeth Mubiana, a field animator of Women for Change: "In Kalomo, there are some places which are still feared. People are telling us you can't go there. Local people have routes were to pass. There are no proper roads for vehicles. Development wise, there are people who want projects there but we can't access."⁷⁰

Like other NGOs and development agencies, Women for Change members are faced with a difficult situation. They must work with communities, which have lagged behind because of the liberation wars, to build conditions which can support basic needs and services. The debt burden has meant that infrastructure and basic needs in areas of armed conflict are not easily fulfilled. It requires much more than an NGO and members of civil society. It requires some level of multiple support which can more easily be done at a scale of government or international action. For development to take place, the causes must be dealt with and outstanding problems, like economic and policy issues and land mines, need to be cleared.

Besides land mines, in some areas where freedom fighters and refugees were based, bombs and grenades are still being found. Near Lusaka town, at Chikumbi, where there is a mass graveyard of hundreds of Zimbabwe nationalists massacred by Rhodesian forces air raids in August 1978, some people have been casualties of grenades left behind years before. Amake Kankhondo, "Kankhondo's Mother," mentions that in June 1998 two family members died and a friend was injured in a grenade incident.⁷¹ Even in their gardens, people in Chikumbi have continued to find grenades. They are now cautious and alert authorities to come and deal with bombs and grenades.

Due to problems of national debt, there has not been much organised reconstruction of the community. Residents of Chikumbi will still remain with the history of the Southern Africa liberation struggle. First having hosted Mozambican (FRELIMO) freedom fighters, Zimbabwean fighters then followed. Kankhondo, "the Little War," was born in 1978, a day before the Rhodesian Airforce raided the ZAPU centre at Chikumbi and killed hundreds of people. Because he was born at the time of the raids and survived, his grandmother then named him Kankhondo.

People of Chikumbi and areas surrounding the former Zimbabwean base have many children whose fathers were Zimbabwean freedom fighters. Zambia's external debt affects the ability to meet cost of social services. Due to the external debt conditions, many of these Chikumbi young men and women have not been able to meet the cost of basic needs like education.

2..."Frontline Countries," "Frontline States" - "Frontline," a term implying forward front. contact. positions in a battle.

3..."The Truth about the Region," by John Daniel a former Senior Researcher with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Vol 14 No 4, August 1999, p3 and quotes this view, written in the TRC Report Volume 5, p 257.

4... Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2, p 43, quoted in "The Truth about the Region," by John Daniel a former Senior Researcher with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Vol 14 No 4, August 1999, p 3.

5...In the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. Volume 2, p 43, quoted in John Daniel. "The Truth about the Region," in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Vol 14, No 4, August 1999.

⁶ Nelson Mandela on Zambia Information Services video "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle." ZIS, 1997. Lusaka.

⁷ Zambia Information Services video, "Zambia, Birth Place of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997. Lusaka.

8... *Fifth Summit Conference of East and Centreal African States MANIFESTO ON SOUTHERN AFRICA*, Lusaka 14th - 16th April 1969. Government Printer, Lusaka. p1.

9... *Africa South of the Sahara 1988*, p1081.

10...Black Caucus-Africa Research Centre, *The Sanctions Weapon. A Summary of The Debate over Sanctions Against South Africa*, Buchu Books, Cape Town, 1989. p 63. Quoting Zambia President Kenneth Kaunda.

11...George Crown, "Success of the Arms embargo," in Joseph Hanlon, (ed), *South Africa. The Sanctions Report*, A Report from the Independent Expert Group on the Evaluation of the Application & Impact of Sanctions against South Africa, prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. Published by Commonwealth Secretariat, James Curry. and Heinemann, 1990. pp 168- 172.

12...Coverage of the role of banks and financial instituions in sustaining apartheid includes *APARTHEID-CAUSED DEBT - The Role of German and Swiss Finance*, Jubilee 2000 South Africa, 1999. English Version.

13...*South Africa, The Sanctions Report*, A Report from the Independent Expert Study Group on the Evaluations of the Application of Impact of Sanctions against South Africa prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.

14... Jorge Jardim, *Sanctions Double-Cross, Oil to Rhodesia*, Intervencao, 1978, Lisbon.

15...Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1974, p 212 quotes President Kenneth Kaunda on August 10, 1966 Radio Zambia saying the OAU efforts were "most disappointing to say the least." Page 215 continues the discussion on similar disappointment with the United Nations.

31..... From SIPRI Year Books 1970s- 1982, showing some of Zambia's defence procurement.

³²..... Lt General Benjamin Mibenge on Zambia Information Services video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

33..... Gabriel Banda, *Adjusting to Adjustment*, Oxfam Publications, 1991. p 10.

³⁴ Gen Kingsley Chinkuli in Zambia Information Services video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka

35..... Samples of Rhodesian raids into Zambia and frontline states can be found in: *Selous Scouts Top Secret War*, a story Lt Col Reid Daly told to Peter Stiff, Galago Publishing, South Africa and Kent.

36..... Kenneth Kaunda, in "A Path of Revolution, Twelfth General Conference of UNIP - September 1978.P 14. 2 1978. p 14.

37..... UNECA, *South African Destabilisation - The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, UNECA 1 and UNICEF's *Children on the Frontline* deal with war-related costs.

38..... Major General Tom Fara, one time in charge of Zambia Army operations on the Zambezi River front, mentioned in an interview with writer in September 2000, that some refugee settlements in Eastern Zambia were attacked by Portuguese forces. Following such events, Zambia had to insure that refugees lived in safety.

39..... UN Security Council Resolution S/PV 1944, July 27, 1976 is referred to have recognised South Africa's sponsorship of the Mushala group, in "Zambia: The Crises of Liberation," by Timothy M Shaw and Douglas Anglin, in *Southern Africa: Continuing Crisis*, ed Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Macmillan, 1979. pp 199-222.

40..... Also mentioned is that, while by and large most were supportive of Zambia's stance in supporting the struggle, some were taking away resources which could have gone to Zambians. Also mentioned in Timothy M Shaw and Douglas G Anglin, "Zambia: The Crises of Liberation," in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crises*, edited by Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Macmillan Press, 1979, pp 199 - 222. The chapter is a good general introduction to Zambia's role in some events of the Southern Africa and international stage.

⁴¹..... Dr Kenneth Kaunda reflecting in 1994 ZNBC special television programme in an interview with Kenneth Maduma, just after Nelson Mandela becomes South Africa President - "The Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa: Kaunda's role," 1994.

⁴² Zambia Information Services Video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

43... Timothy M Shaw and Douglas G Anglin, "Zambia: The Crises of Liberation," in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crises*, edited by Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Macmillan, 1979. pp 199-222. Quoting *African Business* of May 1975, Note 20 gives debt stock and debt service ratio at 1975.

44... Oxfam's Kevin Watkins, Senior Policy Adviser, for instance has also in the year 2000 argued that HIPC might be unfavourable and that Zambia's interest payments may actually increase if IMF-World Bank decide in December 2000 that Zambia joins HIPC. Quoted in "Zambia's Debt Relief a Fraud," by Janet Ilunga, in *Business Times*, August 28 -September 10,

36th Anniversary of independence,

62..... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*, UNDP.P22.

63..... *Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 1996*, CSO, p 126, mentioned also in *National Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework*, Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, May 1998, Lusaka, p 7.

64..... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*, UNDP Lusaka. P 27.

65..... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*. P 42.

66..... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*. P 42.

⁶⁷.... Compiled from figures from various State of the World's Children Reports, UNICEF, and *UNDP Human Development Report 1998*. From the late 1990s, it may be advisable to go back to statistics which were done at particular periods as there is now a tendency to cover decline in the quality of life by organisations to work on averages extending across good and poor figures for previous periods, which were better than the present - thus masking the present decline. Sometimes poorer figures are published retrospectively.

⁶⁸.... UNECA's *South Africa Destabilisation: the Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, Commissioned by UNECA and the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for Economic Recovery and Development, UNECA, 1989. Quoted in *Art from the Frontline*, p 17.

⁶⁹.... Mrs Emily Sikazwe, in discussion with writer, September 2000, Lusaka.

⁷⁰.... In conversation with writer, September 2000, Lusaka. Elizabeth Mubiana has worked with Women for Change in Sinazeze, Southern Province, and, earlier, in Senanga, Western Province, areas which were greatly affected by raids by external troops.

⁷¹.... "Amake Kankhondo," Kankhondo's Mother Jessy Phiri and her brother Jason Phiri, in discussion with writer, September 2000, Chikumbi, near Lusaka.

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Case Study

Advocacy on Debt

2000

Zambia Against Apartheid A Case on Apartheid- Caused Debt

Banda, Gabriel C

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